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-ABSTRACT 
The problem is to elucidate the nature of two types of 
commitments that involve an objective bond, the promise and the vow. 
The basis for the discussion is an article by Adolf Reinach, "The 
Apriori Foundations of Civil Law''. Promising and the promise are 
compared and contrasted with vowing and the .vow. 
The method used is an attitude of openness to the data 
which present themselves. The essential chararcteristics of these 
entities are examined. 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
The term "commitment" is a genera 1 one referring to a type 
of bond which comes into existence through an act of the person. 
The ty pe of act determines the type of commitment. Commitments can 
be divided into two major t ypes: those which involve an objective 
bond. and those which do not. The term "objective." as it will be 
used in this paper. should be understood as referring to a bond 
which has an extra-mental existence. and which comes into existence 
automatically through a particular act of the person. independently 
of an individual's desires or the laws of a particular society, and 
which continues to exist independently of an individual's desires or 
the laws of a society. 1 The term "objective" can have a meaning 
which does not coincide with the above definition of "objective". 
This, together with the sense in which a bond that would be 
objective in one sense can also be called "subjective" in another 
sense. will be discussed below. 
A commitment that does not involve an objective bond could 
be. for example. a commitment to an ideal or to a way of life. Here 
it could be that a person merely makes an internal resolution to be 
committed. If the commitment is taken seriously. he will make the 
ideal a priority in all the relevant decisions that he makes . As 
will be seen. a purely internal resolution is not a type of act that 
can bring an objective claim and obligation into existence. 
1 
-A type of act that can bring an objective claim and 
obligation into existence belongs to the class of what Reinach calls 
social acts. A social act is one which is not only directed to 
another person, but which is addressed to another per scn , and so 
needs to be announced. 2 Promising is such an act; thus a t ype of 
commitment that does involve an objective bond is the promise. 
The present discussion will be limited to the type of 
commitments which do involve an objective bond. Specificall y , the 
promise and the vow will be chosen for discussion. 
It is important to recognize that there is a distinction 
between the act of promising and the promise itself, 3 and similarly 
a distinction between the making of a vow and the vow itself. 
Clearly. promising, which can also be expressed as making a promise, 
brings the promise itself into existence. Similarly, vowing, or the 
making of a vow, brings a vow into existence. Care will be taken to 
never confuse the verb with the noun, so to speak. 4 
It will be assumed throughout this paper that the promise 
and the vow are each identical to the obligatory relationship, or 
bond, that is brought into existence by promising or vowing. 
The nature of the act of promising and the promise itself will first 
be analyzed from Adolf Reinach's point of view which he explains in 
his article: "The Apriori Foundations of Civil Law". An exposition 
and further clarification will be made, and some related questions 
not discussed by Reinach will be addressed. On the basis of the 
above analysis, the making of a vow and the vow itself will next be 
analyzed. The analysis will be limited to one particular type of 
vow, the marriage vow. Thus a comparison and contrast between 
2 
promising and the making of a marriage vow on the one hand, and 
between the promise and the marriage vow on the other, . will be 
accomplished. 
3 
_J~ __________ ___________ ...,;...._ __ ____, _ _
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CHAPTER TWO: THE ACT OF PROMISING 
The nature of the act of promising and the promise itself 
are perfect targets for a philosophical analysis. Promising is an 
act with which everyone is somewhat familiar, but the complex 
nature of which is not often recognized and certainly not widely 
understood. Promising is one of those unique acts of the person 
that result in a bond. That a bond comes into existence is clear 
when it is recognized that promising creates an obligation for the 
one who promises, and a claim for the person to whom the promise is 
addressed; promising " ••• gives the person to whom it is made a right 
to expect or to claim the performance or forbearance of a specified 
act. 115 The claim and obligation are what constitute an "obligatory 
relationship 116 which is what binds the two parties together. 
The nature of the act of promising has often been 
misunderstood. A common definition of promising is that it is a 
"declaration of will, or more exactly, an expressing or making known 
the intention of doing or omitting something in the interest of 
another to whom the utterance is made. 117 Reinach points out a 
fundamental problem with this definition: why should the expression 
of one's intention result in an objective claim and obligation? 
While it is clear that a resolution to do something could result in 
a psychological bond, or inner tendency to act in accordance with 
one's resolution, this psychological bond does not entail an 
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objective claim or obligation. Furthermore, Reinach says that he 
does not see why an objective claim and obligation should come into 
existence just because one has an intention which is somehow in the 
interests of another. 
It is obvious to Reinach that the above difficulties in 
accounting for the existence of an objective claim and obligation 
result from a misunderstanding of the nature of promising from the 
outset: promising is not reducible to making known a decision of 
will, rather the two are fundamentally different from each other, in 
spite of the fact that they might make use of the same linguistic 
expressions. 8 Actually, the fact that there can be a 
misunderstanding whereby a person thinks he has a claim against 
another person when in reality the other person has only expressed his 
intention to do something instead of making a promise, attests to 
the fact that promising and making known one's intention are 
completely different. 9 
If promising is, then, more than a simple declaration 
of intention, what exactly is it? First of" all, Reinach points out 
that promising is not only an intentional act, in that it refers to 
some object, it is also a spontaneous act, which is a "doing of the 
self, 1110 an act in which "the self shows itself to be the phenomenal 
originator of the act. 1111 Certain spontaneous acts, like the act of 
forgiving, or the act of intending, can but need not be expressed 
externally, while it is the nature of other spontaneous acts to need 
to be announced. These latter type of acts are called by Reinsch 
'social acts.' Promising is such an act. It is other-directed, and 
so presupposes a second subject to whom the act is related. It also 
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addresses the other; the other must become aware of it. and for this 
reason promising needs to be externally expressed. Reinach points 
out that it is only because of the nature of the human person that 
promising needs to be externally expressed. If it were possible for 
another person to become aware of the act of promising in another 
way. then the external expression would not be a requirement. 12 
The act of promising has an inner and an outer side. It 
is not a purely inner experience. nor a purely external experience. 
nor simply the announcing of an inner experience. even if this inner 
experience were an intention. as was stated above. Reinach explains 
that the inner side of promising always remains the same. but the 
outer side can vary. Taking the outer side first. it is clear that 
a promise can be expressed by spoken word. written word. gestures. 
etc. 13 
Characteristic of the expression of promising is that it is 
"completely subject to our voluntariness. 1114 unlike other types of 
expressions which may be involuntary. like crying or smiling. 
Further. the external expression of promising is not something 
optional which is simply added to an inner experience. Rather it is 
a voluntary utterance which forms an inner unity with the inner 
voluntary act. Reinach emphasizes this unity by stating that " ••• the 
inner experience here is not possible without the utterance. 1115 
What is the nature of the inner side of the act of promising 
which Reinach has referred to as an inner experience? It cannot be a 
mere act of intending if promising is held to be more than an 
expression of intention. Rather. it must be the actual promising 
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itself, the very act of binding the self to the performance or 
omission of a specific action which is " ••• performed in the very act 
of speaking ••• 1116(0f course as mentioned above the spoken word· is 
only one of the ways in which the inner side of promising can be 
expressed.) 
The inner side of the act of promising must be more than 
simply an act of intending even if the act of intending is that of 
intending to make a promise. It might be helpful to consider an 
example. A person can intend to invite another person for dinner. He 
can also intend to promise to invite another for dinner. This second 
intention, even if expressed, is not an act of promising, nor is the 
unexpressed intention even the inner side of the act of promising. 
It remains a mere intention, even though it is an intention to 
promise. 
In explicating the difference between an expression of an 
inner experience of accepting and a social act of accepting, Reinach 
arrives at certain distinctions between the two which seem also to 
apply to the differences between an intention to promise and the 
social act of promising itself. The first of these distinctions is 
that, while the expression of acceptance can be directed to anyone, 
the social act of acceptance must be directed toward the promisor. 
Secondly. the expression of acceptance can be meaningfully repeated 
and directed towards many persons. but a social act of acceptance, 
as a response to a particular act of promising. can meaningfully be 
performed only once. Finally. the expression of acceptance can refer 
to a past or present experience of accepting and so can be made in 
the past or present tense. The social act of acceptance, however, 
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can only be made in the present tense. 17 
An application of· the above distinctions to the issue at 
hand can easily be made, The expression of an intention to promise, 
or simply the expression of an intention, can meaningfully be 
directed to persons other than the promisee, while the same is not 
possible with the social act of promising, The expression of the 
intention to promise can be repeated and directed towards many 
persons, while the social act of promising can meaningfully be 
performed only once, In other words, if a person makes a promise to 
a friend and then repeats himself in order to make sure that the 
friend has not forgotten, there is not then more than one promise. 
Finally, the expression of an intention to promise refers to the 
future, and therefore is made in the future tense, while promising 
must be made in the present tense. 
Furthermore, it is clear by the above that the expression of 
an intention to promise occurs without a promise coming into being. 
Take the following example: Sue says to M_ary, "I've been wanting to 
have John over for dinner for a while now, but I get so busy. I've 
decided to promise him that I will invite him, and this way I will 
make it a priority." Obviously, in this example a claim does not 
come into being for Mary, nor even for John. If Sue were to repeat 
the expression of intention to others, these other persons would 
also not thereby have claims. And the expression itself, which is 
made in the future tense, is meaningful. The future tense signifies 
that the promise has not yet been made. 
Because a claim has not come into being, if Sue were to 
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decide that she is too busy to make that promise to John. she could 
still change her mind. If she had made a promise. however, her 
obligation would remain whether it was inconvenient to fulfili or 
not. (There can be an exception to this last point. This exception. 
together with the question of how the situation should be evaluated 
if John happens to depend on Sue's intention. will be addressed 
below). Finally. the intention to promise is not a social act at 
all. because an intention to promise need not be expressed. 
Reinach next explains that all social acts. including the 
act of promising. presuppose internal experiences which do not 
necessarily express themselves to others. but are internally 
complete.18 The internal experience presupposed by the act of 
promising is an intention to do the t hing promised. and this is 
expressed by Reinach when he says: "Every promising to do this or 
that. presupposes that one's wil 1 is directed to this action." 19 
Thus if a person promises his neighbor to watch his house while he 
is on vacation. as long as he is promising authentically. it must be 
that he intends to watch his neighbor's house. 
Later. Reinach calls this internal experience of intending 
an "inner experience". He says. 
Like all social acts. promising presupposes an inner 
experience which has the content of the promise as its 
intentional object. As with commanding. this inner 
experience is that of intending that something occur. 
not of course through the addressee but through the 
promiser himself. 20 
Reinach's calling the internal experience of intending which 
promising presupposes an 'inner experience' and applying the same 
term to the inner side of the act of promising can lead to 
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confusion, especially since he wants to distinguish the two. It must 
be remembered that the inner side of the act of promising does 
necessarily express itself; it is not internally complete but must 
exist in unity with an utterance. Further, it is not a mere act of 
intending, but is rather the actual promising, the 'binding of the 
self', The internal experience presupposed by promising, on the 
other hand, does not necessarily express itself but is internally 
complete, and is simply an act of intending. 
It seems, then, that if Reinach's terminology is used, there 
are actually three 'inner experiences' involved with the act of 
promising. They are an intention to do 'X'. an intention to promise 
to do 'X'. and the inner side of the act of promising, The first two 
are internally complete, the last is not, as stated above. Although 
they are different, the intentional objects of each of them coincide 
or at least are related to each other. 21 The intentional object is 
the content of the 'inner experience', that is. the specific act(s) 
which one has intended to perform or omit, and/or intended to 
promise to perform or omit, and/or promised to perform or omit. In 
other words, the internally complete inner experiences of intending 
to do ''X" • intending to promise to do ''X". together with the inner 
side of the act of promising. all must refer to the same action. It 
is also clear that the outer side or external expression of 
promising must refer to the same action as these "inner 
experiences". If the promising is sincere. it presupposes an 
intention to promise to do ''X". and the intention to promise 
presupposes an intention to do ''X". 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE PROMISE AS THE RESULT OF THE ACT OF PROMISING 
What must be explored next is the bond which comes into 
existence by the act of promising. It is the efficacy characteristic 
of promising. that promising brings an objective bond into 
existence. that " ... something is thereby changed in the world". 22 
that makes it such an a.mazing and interesting act of the person. As 
Von Hildebrand states. "Among the various human experiences there 
is one kind which is not merely an inner act in respect to another 
person such as love. respect, joy. and so on. but which creates an 
objective reality independent of the person. 1123 This 'objective 
reality' is the promise itself. the bond which exists between the 
person who has the claim and the one who has the obligation. 
That the bond created by the act of promising must be 
objective should become clear as the nature of the bond is 
revealed. The term 11obj ective" must first be clarified. In what 
sense can it be said that the bond created by the act of promising 
is objective? Something can be cal led "objective" and by this is 
meant that it has no dependence upon a person. For example. the 
fact that a particular atom has a certain amount of electrons is not 
dependent upon the existence of persons. The bond created by the act 
of promising is certainly not objective in this sense. for not only 
is the bond created by an act of a person. it also is dependent upon 
the existence of the persons involved. In other words. except in 
-certain cases which will be discussed below, if either the promiser 
or promisee dies, the promise also ceases to exist. 
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Secondly, something can be called "objective" and by this is 
meant that it is predicable of an object. The bond would be 
subjective in contrast to this definition of objective, because it 
is not a predicate of anything. It is, rather, a relation between 
the promiser and promisee. 
The term "objective" is an opposite of the term 
"subjective," although one must be careful since the te r m 
"subjective" itself has more than one meaning. The bond created by 
the promising is not subjective in the sense of existing in the mind 
of a person, where this would entail the feelings and desires of a 
person being capable of affecting the existence of the bond. It 
seems patently obvious that the very essence of the promise 
precludes any dependence on feelings or desires. A promise does not 
cease to exist, for example, simply because the promiser no longer 
feels like fulfilling his obligation. 
An objection might here be raised; it could be argued that a 
promise is in fact dependent upon feelings, because there is no 
obligation for the promisee to accept the claim, 24 and so if his 
feelings change, he can simply waive the promise. Although it is 
true that the promisee can waive the promise, it is not his change 
of feelings themselves which waive the claim, but rather it is an 
act by which he waives his claim. Of course. the reason for the act 
of waiving could very well be a change of feelings. 
So in contrast to the above definition of "subjective," that 
is, existing in the mind of a person, the bond created by promising 
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is objective. The bond is also objective in the sense that it comes 
into existence automatically through the act of promising. 
independently of an individual's desires or the laws of a particular 
society. and continues to exist independently of an individual's 
desires or the laws of a particular society. 
On the other hand the bond is "subjective" when this term is 
defined as having a relation to a person. or being somehow dependent 
upon the existence of a person.25 
What then is the nature of this bond. of the claim and 
obligation which are created by the act of promising? First of all. 
Reinach explains that. although claim and obligation are obviously 
not physical entities. neither are they merely psychical or mental 
experiences. and this for the following reasons: Claim and 
obligation " ••• can last for years without change. but there are no 
experiences which last like this. 1126 Claim and obligation exist even 
when one is not actively thinking about them. for example when one 
is asleep or unconscious. 27 
Further. an obligation does not cease to exist if the 
promisor forgets that he has an obligation. Obviously forgetting 
that one has an obligation does not excuse one from it. except in 
some instances if the promisor has suffered a loss of rationality. 
This situation will be addressed below. 
It is also clear that one does not lose a claim simply 
because one has forgotten about it. One could forget about a claim 
and yet demand fulfillment years later; this is because it is the 
promisor's responsibility to make sure that the obligation is 
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fulfilled. 
Claim and obligation can not be reduced to mere feelings of 
being obligated or of having a claim. because as Reinach points out. 
"Nothing is more certain than that I can very wel 1 feel myself to be 
obliged without there really being any obligation. and that on the 
other hand I can very well have a claim without feeling myself to be 
en tit led at the moment in which I have it. 1128 
Another possibility is that a person can have an obligation 
without feeling obliged. One can forget the obligation or perhaps 
talk oneself out of it. saying for example that the promisee does 
not really care about the promise. or has forgotten about it and 
will not care if it is not fulfilled. Neither of these affect the 
actual obligation in the least. 
A fourth possibility is that one thinks one has a claim when 
one really does not. as in the example mentioned above of the 
misunderstanding that can occur if a person thinks that a promise 
has been made when really no such promise exists. These four 
possible discrepancies between a person's belief and the actual 
state of affairs concerning claim and obligation demonstrates the 
fact that the promise exists independently of the beliefs. desires 
and even memories of both the promiser and promisee. 
Next. claim and obligation are temporal. 29 They come into 
being at a certain point in time. and they each refer to a future 
action. A promise can. " •.. according to its essence. last ever so 
long. but on the other hand it seems to have an inherent tendency 
towards meeting an end and a dissolution. 1130 According to Reinach. a 
promise is dissolved if the obligation is fulfilled. which is the 
-
-natural end of the promise, if the promisee waives the claim, or if 
the promisor revokes the promise. 31 
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On the other hand, although it is natural that the promise 
have an end in time by being fulfilled, it also can exist unaffected 
by time. That is, it can exist for years without change. as 
mentioned above. 
Reinach holds that certain immediately 
intelligible laws. laws which are at the same time a priori and 
synthetic. apply to claim and obligation. These laws are 
necessarily grounded in the essences of these entities. Two 
examples of such laws are the fol lowing: "A claim to have something 
done dissolves as soon as the thing is done, 1132 and "a claim can 
only arise in the person to whom the promise is addressed. 1133 It 
seems that other so to speak parallel laws are that the obligation 
to do something dissolves as soon as the thing is done. and an 
obligation can only arise in the person who makes the promise. 
(There is a possible exception to the second of these laws. when it 
comes to a promise which involves a third party. This will be 
discussed below.) 
Next. claim and obligation presuppose universally and 
necessarily a bearer. and this bearer must be a person. 34 Since it 
does not seem to make much sense for a person to be obligated to 
himself. or to have a claim against himself. it seems that another 
requirement is that the same person cannot be bearer of both claim 
and obligation that stem from the same act of promising. 
Actually. Reinach holds promising to be a social act; as such 
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it adresses another person and therefore involves more than one person. 
This precludes the _ possibility of a person being able to promise 
himself something. What is loosely called "promising oneself'' to do 
something. for example promising oneself to lose weight. to do more 
reading. to try to be a better person. is actually an internal 
resolution. Since it is purely internal and therefore not a social 
act. it could not be called an act of promising according to 
Reinach's definition. 
Claim and obligation presuppose universally and necessarily 
a definite content to which they refer. Every obligation refers to a 
future action of its bearer whether the action be a doing. omitting, 
or tolerating.34 The action is to take place through the bearer of 
the obligation. Reinach explains that a person 11 ••• can be obliged 
that something take place through another. But here too it must be 
my action which is supposed to lead to the action of the other. 1136 
For example. a person can promise his parent to make sure that a 
younger sibling cleans his or her room. 
A different situation from the one above would occur if a 
person promised a parent to take out the garbage. and then paid a 
younger brother to do it. Unlike in the first situation, the 
obligation is not specifically to take place through another. Has 
the promise been fulfilled? The answer to this question hinges on 
the wording of the promise. Saying, "I promise that I wil 1 take out 
the garbage," is different from saying• "I promise that the garbage 
wil 1 be taken out." The latter wording clearly leaves the 
possibility open for getting someone else to fulfill the obligation. 
The promisor would. of course, still be obliged to make sure that 
the obligation is fulfilled. 
Since claim and obligation must have identical corttent. 37 it is 
clear that every claim also refers to a future action, that is, to 
the same action to which the corresponding obligation refers. 
Reinach explains that although the immediate content of 
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the obligation is the action of the promisor, still this is not 
always its only or final content. There is, in other words, a 
difference between obligations which tend toward an action and find 
their fulfillment in it, and obligations which aim through the 
action at the realization of an end result. In the former case, the 
way of acting is necessarily determined. In the latter case, 
however, it is only the end result which is determined. An example 
of the former type of obligation is the following: A person knows 
how much his wife loves to dance, but it happens that she is so busy 
lately that she has not danced in a long time. At his request. she 
promises him to dance at least one time a week. Here, it is the 
danc i ng itself which fulfills the obligation. not some other end, 
like for example exercising. 
An example of the second type of obligation. one which aims 
at the realization of an end result, is the following: A person 
promises his mother to get rid of an old car which has been in the 
driveway for months and does not run. It is up to the promiser to 
decide how to fulfill the obligation. He can have it towed away. 
fix it enough to drive it to the junkyard himself, sell it for 
parts, fix it and then sell it, etc. It is the absence of the car. 
no matter how that absence is effected, that will fulfill the 
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obligation. 
Of course it could be that both the action itself and the 
end result of the action are determined. An example of this wou·ld be 
if one promises to dance because one needs the exercise. but a 
specific reference to dancing is made. 
CHAPTER FOUR: QUESTIONS THAT ARISE ON THE BASIS OF THE ABOVE 
ANALYSIS 
19 
There are many more things t hat can be said about the act of 
promising and the promise itself, but they cannot all be addressed 
here. Some questions that follow from the brief analysis given above 
will now be examined. 
First of all, Reinach had said that if promising is 
understood as an expression of intention, then the fact that 
promising creates an objective claim and obligation can never be 
explained, even if it is assumed that the intention is somehow in 
the interests of another. There is a problem here however. Is it 
not true that an expression of intention can bring forth an 
objective claim and obligation? For example, what if a person 
relies on an expression of intention to such an extent that he would 
suffer harm as a result of a change of intention? Would the person 
who made the expression of intention not then have an obligation to 
refrain from changing it? Reinach provides the answer by explaining 
that a moral duty can very well arise in such a situation, but the 
ground of this duty is not the statement of intention but rather the 
fact that it is right to avoid harming another. The moral duty 
presupposes that its content is morally right. The obligation which 
is created by the act of promising, however, does not presuppose a 
morally right state of affairs. 38 One has an obligation to take a 
friend out to dinner as a result of promising this action to the 
friend, but taking someone out to dinner is in itself morally 
neutral. 
Of course the content of the promising does not have to be 
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morally neutral, it could be morally right, as when a person who has 
a drinking problem promises his family to stop abusing alcohol. It 
is morally wrong to abuse alcohol, and the promisor thus has 
a moral duty to stop doing so, but now since he has made a promise 
he has a further obligation to refrain from the abuse in order to 
fulfill the obligation of the promise. 39 (A different situation 
altogether, that of the content of the promising being immoral, will 
be addressed below). 
Reinach holds that the obligation of the promise is itself 
extra-moral, but that a moral duty is created by the act of 
promising in that it is morally right to keep one's promises. The 
moral duty here presupposes the obligation created by the promising. 
Even though the moral duty is inseparable from the promising, the 
moral duty " ••• has to be distinguished as sharply as possible from 
the obligation." 40 
It seems, however, that Reinach is making the analysis more 
complicated than it needs to be, especially because the idea of an 
obligation which is not itself moral is a strange one. 41 In the 
example of the person who promises to stop abusing alcohol, Reinach 
would have to hold that the promisor now has three duties: the moral 
duty to refrain from the abuse, the duty to refrain from the abuse 
the sole ground of which is the act of promising, and the moral duty 
to refrain from the abuse the ground of which duty is the duty 
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created by the promising. 
It seems rather that the promisor in this case has only two 
duties, both of which are moral: the moral duty to refrain from the 
abuse, the ground of which is a morally right state of affairs, and the 
moral duty to refrain from the abuse the sole ground of which is the 
act of promising. 
Next, in pointing out the fact that promising and 
expressing an intention can make use of the same linguistic 
expressions, Reinach mentions that the following misunderstanding is 
possible: A person can mistakenly think that a 
promise has been made to him when in reality all that had been done 
was that an intention had been expressed. It is important here to 
realize that the person thought to be the promisor cannot have 
intentionally led the other to believe that he was making a promise 
when he actually never meant to fulfill the promise. Otherwise what 
would occur would be what Reinach refers to as a 'pseudo-promise'. 
In making a pseudo-promise, one turns to another and expresses 
oneself just as one would in making a sincere promise; however, one 
only pretends to be promising authentically without a sincere 
intention of doing the thing promised, 42 
An interesting question that arises is whether the person 
thought to be the promiser has an obligation to rectify the 
erroneous belief. With the first case, in which the one thought to be 
the promisor did not intentionally deceive the other person, it must 
first of all be assumed that the 'promiser' is aware of the mistaken 
belief. Then the answer to this question depends on whether the 
person thought to be the promisor is at fault for the mistaken 
impression that he has given. If he is not at fault at all. no 
obligation seems to be present. If he is partly or mostly at fault 
because of ambiguous language or other carelessness. and the 
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mistaken belief is easy to be dispel l ed. then it seems that he would 
have an obligation to do so. This obligation seems to be different 
from the one that would arise from a true act of promising. 43 
If a person has given the impression that he has made a 
promise and it is mostly his fault. yet he does not attempt to 
rectify the mistaken belief. this is still different from a pseudo-
promise. because the person has not pretended to promise but rather 
omitted an action. the act of informing that no promise has been 
made. In the case of a person who makes a pseudo-promise. it is 
clear that there is an obligation to correct the deception. and 
this obligation does not depend on whether it can be easily 
dispelled or not. 
A further question is whether a claim and an obligation come 
into existence concerning the content of the expressed intention or 
the pseudo-promise in any of the above situations. With the 
situation in which it was not the 'promiser's' fault at all that a 
misunderstanding occurred. there would clearly be no obligation to 
fulfill the content of the expressed intention. with the exception 
of the case in which a person would suffer harm otherwise. as 
explained above. 
On the other hand. if it was partly or mostly his fault. and 
if he does nothing to dispel the mistaken belief even though he is 
aware of it. then perhaps he would have an obligation to fulfill the 
-content of the action. especially if harm would come to the 
'promisee'. but even. it seems. if no serious harm would be caused. 
This obligation. again. is distinct from the obligation that arises 
from an actual act of promising. As far as making of a pseudo-
promise is concerned. it might be that a claim and obligation come 
into existence just as if the person would have made a since r e 
promise. 44 
Another question that arises stems from Reinach's belief 
that one possible way for a promise to be dissolved is for the 
promiser to revoke the promise. Although he emphasizes later that a 
revoking can occur only with the permission of the promisee. 45 it 
doesn't seem that a revoking occurs at all. It seems rather that 
what happens is merely a waiving. it is just that the promiser has 
requested the promisee to waive the latter's claim. 46 The fact that 
the promisee might not otherwise waive his claim does not seem to 
thereby warrant the use of the term _ 'revoke'. 
Besides the content of the promise being fulfilled. 
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the promisee waiving his claim. or the promiser revoking the 
promise. Reinach speaks of another 'end' that might come to a 
promise: an obligation can become impossible to fulfill. He 
mentions two ways in which this could occur. First. the promiser 
might become unable to fulfill his obligation. and second. something 
might happen that makes it impossible for the promiser to fulfill 
his obligation through any action. Reinach then states that if it 
does happen that the obligation becomes impossible to fulfill. the 
claim and obligation do not thereby dissolve but the obligatory 
relationship does take on a peculiar kind of meaninglessness; "Claim 
-and obligation have become incurably sick. 1147 
Later, Reinach mentions a situation in which an obligation 
from an act of promising the content of which is immoral is 
outweighed by a higher duty to act morally. 48 This situation is 
different from the two above mentioned possibilities; it cannot 
really be said that the content is impossible to fulfill just 
because it is immoral. There are two points that must here be 
addressed. First of all, are there any other possible ways for a 
promise to 'meet an end' other then the above ways mentioned by 
Reinach7 (The term 'meet an end' is here intentionally vague.) 
Secondly, is it really true that the obligation does not cease to 
exist even though it becomes impossible to fulfill? 
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To start with the first question. it will be helpful to 
consider some examples 49 that would be included under the ways for a 
promise to come to an end that were mentioned by Reinach. The first 
way was that the promisor for some reason becomes unable to fulfill 
his obligation. This must mean that he has .somehow lost an ability 
necessary for the fulfilling of the obligation. For example. a 
person promises his friend that he will look at his paintings, but 
before he can do so he becomes blind or goes into a coma. Or the 
promisor suffers a certain degree of loss of rationality. for 
example becoming senile or getting Alzheimer's Disease. Also 
included in this group of situations would be the death of the 
promisor. (An exception to this last example must be made if the 
promise is such that it has a particular condition. The topic of 
promises that have a condition will be addressed below.) 
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The second way for a promise to 'come to an end' can be that 
something occurs in the world, rather than to the promiser which 
makes it impossible for him to fulfill his obligation. If a person 
promises someone to take him or her sailing, and before he can do so 
the promisee dies, clearly this prevents the obligation from being 
fulfilled. (An exception to this will be addressed under the topic 
of promises that have a condition.) Another example could be that a 
person promises his brother that he will wash his car and before he 
can do so, the car is towed away and demolished. 
Finally, an example of the last way for a promise to come 
to an end that was mentioned by Reinach could be that a person 
promises to steal a pack of gum. As mentioned above, Reinach would 
hold that the obligation to steal the gum would be superceded by the 
higher duty to act morally. 
An affirmative answer can be given to the question of 
whether there is another way for a promise to 'come to an end'. A 
promise can be superceded by a higher duty, even if the content of 
the promise is not immoral.SO Take the example of a person making a 
promise to bring someone out to dinner at a particular time. On the 
way to dinner, the promiser comes across a person who has had an 
accident and needs 'CPR'. It so happens that the promiser knows 
'CPR' and with no harm to himself could easily save the accident 
victim. To let the person die because he wishes to keep his promise 
would clearly be wrong. 
To answer the second question of whether or not an 
obligation ceases to exist even though it becomes impossible 
to fulfill, it will be helpful to determine which cases are those in 
-which the promise clearly ceases to exist. and which are those in 
which the promise becomes impossible to fulfill. 
It is clear that the promise ceases to exist if the 
obligation is fulfilled or the promisee waives his claim. (Revoking 
will not here be addressed because of the problems with revoking 
that were mentioned earlier,) Reinach holds that the promise becomes 
impossible to fulfill but does not thereby dissolve if the promisor 
becomes unable to fulfill the obligation or if an 'external' 
situation arises which prevents the promisor from fulfilling the 
obligation through any action,5 1 Is this true? To take the first 
example of the promisor being unable to fulfill the obligation. 
namely that the promisor has died. it is clear that the obligation 
no longer exists. If there is no obligation then how can the 
promisee have a claim? The dissolution of the obligation has broken 
the obligatory relationship. therefore the promise ceases to exist. 
If on the other hand the promisor loses the ability to 
fulfill the obligation because of blindness. for example. the 
situation is a bit more complex. Take the example of the person who 
promises a friend to look at the friend's paintings but before he 
can do so he goes blind. Does the promise cease to exist? What if 
the blindness is only temporary and to the surprise of everyone the 
promisor regains his vision1 Is he then obligated to look at the 
paintings. or has his obigation been dissolved? One thing is 
certain. and that is that the same obligation cannot pop in and out 
of existence. The only way that the person can be obligated to look 
at the paintings after regaining his vision is if the obligation 
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never ceased to exist in the first place. 
This does seem to be the way to analyze the situation. that 
is. that the promiser does have an obligation once his sight 
returns. It must be then that while he is blind the obligation is 
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suspended. so to speak. Of course if content of the promise included 
a time reference. for example if the person had promised to look at 
the paintings the next day but he becomes blind the day the promise 
was made and does · not regain his sight for a week. then the 
obligation has dissolved and with it the promise. On the other hand 
if the promiser became permanently blind then it seems that the 
obligation would dissolve and thus the promise would cease to exist. 
Further. the existence of the obligation is not dependent on 
the promiser's and/or promisee's awareness of it. In the example 
of the promiser becoming permanently blind. the obligation is 
disso l ved even if everyone believed him to be only temporarily 
blinded. In the example of the promiser being only temporarily 
blinded. he retains his obligation even if everyone believes him to 
be permanently blinded. In this latter case. the obligation is 
suspended and so of course he is not held responsible for an action 
that he cannot perform. So whereas under Reinach's analysis the 
situation of permanent blindness would result in the obligatory 
relationship becoming 'incurably sick' but nonetheless still 
existing. it seems that the correct analysis is rather that if the 
obligation truly becomes impossible to fulfill. then it dissolves 
and thus the promise ceases to exist altogether. 
With the example of the promiser suffering a loss of 
rationality due to senility or Alzheimer's disease. it might be that 
the promiser loses the degree of rationality necessary to fulfill 
the obligation entirely. or that the loss of an adequate degree of 
rationality occurs only periodically. that the person 'goes in and 
out' of rationality. In either case the analysis would be parallel 
to that given for the situation in which the promiser became blind. 
With the death of the promisee. the claim has ceased to 
exist. Thus. the claim-obligation relationship is destroyed, and so 
the promise ceases to exist. (There is a possible exception to this 
when it comes to promises that have conditions. This will be 
discussed below.) 
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The next example is of a promise to wash a car. when the car 
is subsequently towed and demolished. Whether or not the promiser 
was precise in the wording of the promise makes a difference here. 
If he said. "I promise to wash your car" and gives neither a 
reference to a specific vehicle nor a time reference. it seems 
that the obligation remains suspended until the promisee buys a new 
car. at which time the promisor is again responsible for fulfilling 
the obligation. If the promisor refers to a specific car which is 
then towed and demolished. however. the obligation has become truly 
impossible to fulfill and the promiser is no longer obligated. The 
obligatory relationship is destroyed and therefore the promise 
ceases to exist. 
The next situation is that in which the content of 
the promise is immoral and therefore the obligation to fulfill it is 
superseded by a higher duty to act morally. Reinach does not address 
the question of whether this leads to the dissolution of the promise 
-or not. And as mentioned above it does not seem accurate to say of 
the obligation that it is impossible to fulfill just because it is 
immoral. But perhaps Reinach is missing something here. Perhaps it 
makes a difference whether or not the promiser is aware of the 
immorality of the content of the promise. and whether or not the 
content is intrins i cally immoral or only immoral due to external 
circumstances. In the case in which the content is on l y immoral due 
to external circumstances. the content can become immoral 
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where before it was not. For example. a person promises a friend 
that he will buy him a beer at the bar where they plan to meet that 
night. When the promiser gets to the bar. he finds that his fr i end 
has been drinking for a while. and that to buy him a beer now would 
clearly be detrimental. Obviously. buying a beer for a friend is not 
intrinsically immoral. In this situation. however. it would be wrong 
to fulfill the content of the promise. because it has become immoral 
due to external circumstances, that is, the fact that the friend has 
already had too much to drink. 
On the other hand, if the content of the promise is 
immoral from the start, either intrinsically or due to external 
circumstances, then perhaps no promise comes into existence from the 
beginning. This would be the case if it is true that a condition for 
a promise to come into being at all is missing. namely that the 
content not be immora1. 52 
Reinach would strongly disagree with this view, because he 
holds that the obligation is grounded in the nature of promising as 
an act and not in its content; the immorality of the content can. 
therefore, in no way touch this essential law. 53 
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With the situation in which a promise is made and neither 
the promiser nor promisee are aware of the immorality of the 
content. it does not seem that what occurs is that a promise comes 
into existence. but the obligation is superseded by a higher duty to 
act morally. If a condition for a promise to come into existence is 
that the content not be immoral. then it seems that the fact that 
one or both of the partners are not aware of the immorality (or even 
of this condition) has no bearing on the issue. and that the promise 
would not come into existence even if they thought it had. 
If it is true that the content of the promise is not 
intrinsically immoral but it only becomes wrong to fulfill due to 
external circumstances after the promise has been made. then this is 
an entirely different matter. In this case the promiser has not 
violated the above condition for a promise to come into existence 
because the content was not immoral at the time the promise was 
made. And so the promise does come into existence. but the 
obligation to fulfill it is superseded by .the higher duty to do what 
is right. 
Does the outweighed obligation still exist? Is it true that 
in this case rather than being dissolved the obligation takes on a 
kind of meaninglessness. becomes 'incurably sick?' There are two 
possibilities. Since the content is only immoral due to external 
circumstances. it is plausible that these circumstances could change 
in such a way that the content is no longer immoral to fulfill. It 
seems that if this is the case then the obligation is merely 
suspended. and when the time comes that it can be fulfilled without 
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violating the higher duty to act morally, the promiser will again be 
responsible for fulfilling that obligation. The only way for this to 
occur, again, is if the obligation never ceased to exist from the 
start. It might be that during the time in which the obligation is 
suspended the obligatory relationship can be referred to as having 
taken on a sort of meaninglessness. If though, the circumstances never 
change in such a way so as to make the content no longer immoral, 
then it seems that the obligatory relationship would remain in this 
state of 'meaninglessness'. It does not seem that there is any reason 
to believe that the promise would cease to exist. 
Finally, the last case is that in which the content of the 
promise is not immoral, but the obligation to fulfill it is 
superseded nonetheless. The example given for this situation was 
that of a person who makes a promise to take someone out to dinner 
but on his way to dinner comes across a person whose life is in 
danger and whom he could easily save. The duty to take the promisee 
out to dinner is superseded by the duty to save the other's life. 
Does the obligation created by the act of promising still 
exist in this situation, or does it take on the state of 
'meaninglessness' referred to above? The only way that the 
obligation to fulfill the promise is superseded is if it is 
impossible to do both, that is, save the life and keep the promise. 
Otherwise there is no question of superseding. Thus, if the 
obligation created by the act of promising is impossible to fulfill. 
then the promiser cannot be obligated to fulfill it. The obligatory 
relationship is destroyed and so the promise ceases to exist. 
There is another situation which must be addressed. It could 
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happen that a promise does not actually become impossible to 
fµlfill, but that the situation changes from the time the promise is 
made so that it becomes very difficult to fulfill the promise, much 
more difficult then it was at the time the promise was made,5 4 For 
example. a person promises his son that he will buy him a model 
airplane that they have seen in a particular store. When the man 
goes to buy it the next day. he finds that all of them have been 
sold out and will not be reordered. He cannot have it ordered from 
another store, but he can drive twelve hours to another state to buy 
it. Since the situation has changed from the time the promise was 
made, however, so as to make it very difficult for the promiser to 
fulfil 1 his obligation. it seems that the ob ligation has been 
dissolved. In other words, unless a clause is explicitly added to 
the promise to the effect that the obligation becoming extremely 
difficult to fulfill will not dissolve the promise, such as "I 
promise that no matter how long it takes me or how difficult it is. 
I will buy you that model airplane". then it seems that the promise 
would dissolve. Thus it appears that another way for a promise to 
meet an end is for the promise to become unusually difficult, or a 
hardship. to fulfill. at some time after the promise has been made. 
In this case it seems that the obligation is dissolved and thus the 
promise ceases to exist. If it will be a hardship to perform an 
action even before the promise is made and neither party realize it. 
then it seems that the obligation does not come into existence from 
the beginning. 
-It was mentioned above that there were two exceptions to the 
promise ceasing to exist at the death of the promisee or promiser. 
This brings up the topic of promises that have a condition. Reinach 
sharply distinguishes between promises that have conditions but are 
themselves unconditional and conditional promises. With the fo r mer 
type of promise, he explains that claim and obligation come into 
being immediately. The promisee can waive the claim before the 
condition is fulfilled. With a conditional promise, however, the 
claim and obligation come into being only on the fulfillment of the 
condition. There is nothing at the outset that could be waived.5 5 
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It seems that with a promise that has a condition, claim and 
obligation come into existence with the making of the promise, but 
they are 'suspended', so to speak, and are only actualized with the 
fulfillment of the condition. 
With conditional promising, Reinach explains that this type 
of promis i ng. 
is not exactly without any immediate efficacy at all. It 
creates in the promiser a state of being bound which shows 
itself in the fact that he can no longer avoid acquiring an 
obligation when the condition is fulfilled. 1156 
Unfortunately, Reinach does not provide an example of what 
he means by conditional promising, but the difference between no 
longer being able to avoid acquiring an obligation once the 
condition is fulfilled, and having to fullfill a previously 
suspended obligation once the condition is fulfilled, seem to be 
close enough to make one wonder why the concept of 'conditional 
promising' is even necessary. Because of this, only promises 
that have conditions will here be analyzed, and not 'conditional 
promises'. 
-A comm.on type of condition that a promise can have is a 
time limit. so to speak. F·or example . a person says to a friend. "I 
promise to take you out to dinner ·before school starts next week." 
If the promisee then keeps cancelling all of the proposed times to 
have dinner and the promise is not fulfilled before school starts 
the next week. the claim will have dissolved. The promise then. is 
no longer in existence. 
The situation would have to be viewed differently if 
it was the promisor who kept cancelling the dinner dates. In this 
case. if he has not taken his friend out to dinner before school 
started. then he will have broken the promise. meaning that it can 
no longer be fulfilled. The obligation has ceased and thus the 
promise no longer exists. 
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A time limit is not the only condition that a promise can 
have. For example. one can say. "I promise to take you for a ride 
this afternoon. as long as it is not raining then." There are really 
two conditions here. because if it is raining in the afternoon. even 
if it clears up by evening. there is no longer an obligation. and 
thus the promise has ceased to exist. There does not seem to be a 
limit to the amount of conditions which a particular promise can 
have. As seen by the above examples, then. a promise that has one or 
more conditions ceases to exist if the conditions are not met and 
cannot be met in the future. 
A different situation would occur if the condition of the 
promise were the death of the promisor. Suppose that a person says. 
"I promise that if I die before you do. you wil 1 get my house." 
-Peculiar to this type of promise is the fact that the promisor has 
an actualized obligation before the condition is met. for obviously 
he must make provisions before he dies so that the house will be 
left to the promisee. The claim. however. is suspended until the 
condition is fulfilled. At the death of the promiser. the claim 
becomes actualized. but the obligation will have been already 
fulfilled. Or maybe it is that the obligation is really transferred 
to whoever it is that is responsible for taking care of the 
promisor's wishes after he dies. 
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Much more complicated is the situation which occurs if a 
promise has as a condition the death of the promisee. One can say. 
for example. "I promise that if you die before me I will keep up 
your garden." In this situation. the fulfillment of the condition is 
the death of the bearer of the claim. According to Reinach. claim 
and obligation must have a bearer. If the bearer dies. it would seem 
that as in the other cases. the claim ceases to exist. Otherwise. 
who would hold the claim? And since. as said above. the promise is a 
claim-obligation relationship. with the dissolution of the claim. 
that relationship is destroyed. 
That the obligation that arises from promising is totally 
dependent upon the claim of the promisee is also obvious in that 
waiving of the claim leads to the dissolution of the obligation. 
And so if t he condition of the promise is the death of the 
promisee. when the condition is fulfilled. the obligation changes 
from being in a state of suspension to being actualized. but 
the fulfillment of this particular condition is the very thing which 
destroys the obligation. It would appear that to make such a promise 
-would from the start be nonsensica1. 57 
Another type of promise is one in which the addressee of 
the content of the obligation is a person other than the promisee. 
Reinach explains. 
The obligation to do something for someone is different 
from the obligation to someone to do something. So we 
distinguish between the addressee of the content of the 
ob ligation. and the addressee of the ob ligation itself. 58 
In other words. the action. or omission of an action. that will 
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fulfill the obligation is directed not to the bearer of the claim. 
but to a third person. For example. A promises B to pay C $100.00. 
Reinach states that in this example. B need not cease to be the 
bearer of the claim. 59 In fact. it does not seem possible that C 
could be the bearer of the claim if the promise is made to B. That C 
in no way holds the claim is obvious since C may not even be aware 
of the promise. and need not be. 
Furthermore. Reinach had said that a claim can only arise 
for the person to whom the promise is addressed; "It is apriori 
impossible that a person to whom the promise is not directed should 
acquire a claim from it." 60 
To analyse this type of promise in the same manner as the 
previous examples. it should be clear that once A has paid the 
$100.00 to c. the promise is fulfilled and thus ceases to exist. If 
it happened that the promisee died before the promise was fulfilled. 
then the promise would cease to exist since the claim is no longer in 
existence. and the fact that there is a third party involved does 
not seem to change this. 
-The promise would cease to exist unless. however. there are 
two obligations. It is unclear whether this was implied by Reinach 
when he said that a distinction must be made between the obligation 
to someone to do something. and the obligation to do something for 
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someone. If there are two obligations in the case where a third 
party is involved. it seems that the obligation which one would have 
to the third party is dependent upon the obligation which one has to 
the promisee. With the death of the promisee. then. the claim ceases 
to exist. so there is no obligation and therefore there can not be 
an obligation to fulfill the content of the obligation. 
A promise that has a condition can be of the above type. 
that is. it can involve a third party. For example. one can say. "I 
promise you that I wil 1 give Sara $100.00 if it rains tomorrow." If 
it does not rain the next day. or if the promisee dies. then in 
either case the promisor is no longer obligated to give Sara 
$100.00. because the promise has ceased to exist. 
Finally. consider the situation of a promise involving a 
third party that has as a condition the death of the promisee. For 
example a person says. "I promise to take care of your children if 
you die before I do." As in the previous examples. the death of the 
promisee is the dissolution of the claim. and so the problem of how 
the promisor can be obligated without a corresponding claim remains. 
Perhaps when the condition of a promise is the death of the 
promisee. the claim is transferred to the third party. In fact. it 




Another interesting question that arises is whether an 
intention must be of a certain kind in order to b.e presupposed by an 
act of promising. Can absolutely any act of intending be the basis 
for promising? First of all, in order to intend to do something 
rather than simply wish to do it, the action in question must be at 
least possible to accomplish. As Gwennyth Taylor explains, "I may 
only want or intend what I can do, and I can only do or have or 
bring about what is in some sense within my power, within the sphere 
of my influence. 1161 Take the 'intention' of someone to 
lift the Eiffel Tower with his bare hands. The only way that this 
can even be an intention is if the person is deluded as to the 
weight and size of the Eiffel Tower, or if one is under a delusion 
as to one's own strength. 
On the other hand, with regard to any intention which an 
agent has that somehow involves the external world, one never has 
complete or ultimate control over whether or not the intended action 
can be fulfil led. There are, however," degrees of control which a 
person may have over different actions. 62 So the question becomes: 
must there be a higher degree of control over an intended action 
that forms the basis of promising than the degree of control 
necessary for something to be an intention at all? 
Take the intention to do something over which one does 
have an influence, but certainly not ultimate control. For example, 
a student wants to get straight A's. He can intend to do this, 
but this intention cannot be the basis of promising because one does 
not have enough control over the outcome. Even assuming that one 
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has the ability to get straight A's. other possibly unforeseen 
factors. such as sickness. can nonetheless prevent a person from 
accomplishing this. A person could only promise to get the best 
grades that he could under whatever circumstances exist at the time. 
and under those which may arise in the future. 
Another example is that of a person intending to wash a 
friend's car. It is true that one does not have complete contro l 
over this action. Something could happen to prevent one from 
fulfilling this intention. The car could be stolen. or towed away to 
a junkyard and crushed. The likelihood of these things happe ni ng is 
not very high. however; there is here more control than one would 
have over getting straight A's. Thus the intention to wash someone's 
car can form the basis of an act of promising. 
Promising someone to do something which one knows that one 
cannot do would be a pseudo-promise under Reinach's definition. 
because one cannnot intend to do something which one knows one 
cannot do. It can. of course. happen that someone is under the 
impression that he or she can do something . when in actuality this 
i s not possible. It may be that there is a responsibility to find 
out as far as possible whether one does have the ability and whether 
the circumstances will allow the carrying out of the content of the 
promise. before the promise is made. It might also happen that one 
does have the ability to fulfill the obligation created by the 
promising. but that the circumstances change in such a way as to 
make this impossible. as explained above. 
At any rate there must be an adequate degree of control over 
the intended action which forms the basis of promising. and as the 
-examples have shown, this degree of control must be higher than the 
degree necessary for an intent i on to be present at all. 
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Another question is: Must the intended act be at least 
potentially of interest to another perosn in order for the intention 
to be the basis of an act of promising? As an example, suppose that 
a person intends to do something which no one else could possibly 
care about, for example, a person who lives alone decides to 
rearrange his sock drawer. Could he make a promise to someone to do 
this? Although it would be strange to make a promise which is of no 
interest to someone, it does not seem at first that this would make 
the act of promising invalid, where invalidity is understood as 
preventing the promise from coming into existence. An explanation 
for this might be given in the following way: Could it not happen 
that, even though a person does not really care whether or not his 
friend's sock drawer is rearranged, if he is promised that it will 
be arranged, and then it is not, he would feel that his claim was 
violated? 
The feelings involved with the promise are basically 
irrelevant, however, since the bond formed by promising is objective 
and therefore exists outside the realm of feelings, desires, etc. 
Reinach explains that "Nothing is more certain than that I can very 
well feel myself to be obliged without there really being any 
obligation, and that on the other hand I can very well have a claim 
without feeling myself to be entitled at the moment in which I have 
it. 1163 So the question must always be whether or not the person's 
feeling or belief points to an actual claim. 
41 
A second response could be that a promise does come into 
existence even if the content is of no interest to the addressee, 
because the content could become of interest to him. For example, an 
old man promises his young grandson that when the boy becomes a man 
he will buy him a house. The child understands what his grandfathe r 
has said, but does not really care. When the boy has become a man 
he remembers his grandfather's promise, which is now of great 
interest to him. Is it not clear that the man has a claim and the 
grandfather an obligation? 
The fact that something is of interest to a person, however. 
does not mean that that person thereby has a claim. A person can 
very well feel himself to have a claim when he really does not. 
There would only be a claim if the promise came into existence at 
the time when the addressee was not interested in it, Either a 
promise exists from the very beginning. when the promisor utters the 
binding statement, or the promise does not exist at all. So the 
question remains, can a promise come into existence at all if it is 
of no interest to the addressee? 
It does seem strange that a person can have a claim for 
something which in no way interests him. John Searle states that a 
promise is defective if the thing promised is not something the 
hearer wants done or considers to be in his interests, or would 
prefer having done to not having done. 64 A defective promise. 
however, is nonethless a promise. On the other hand. Gwennyth Taylor 
seems to hold that for a promise to come into existence, the person 
to whom the promising is addressed must be interested in the content 
of the promising. She gives the following example to show how an 
I: 
-utter lack of interest renders the promising unintelligible: 
For consider again the case of promising and imagine a 
promise such as the following: I promise to bring you the 
highest leaf from the topmost branch of the first elm I see 
on my way home. Suppose neither party is a botanist, 
conservationist or child; and there is no ascertainable 
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point to the offer/acceptance. For what relevent actions ensuing 
from that promise could I be held responsible? 65 
She continues: "Suppose the following day I say 'Look, I didn't get 
that leaf, but I've brought a pebble instead, and since they are 
equivalent I have kept my promise, haven't I' How could one know 
whether the promise had been kept? 1166 
It appears, then, that for a promise to come into existence 
the content of the act of promising must be of interest to the 
addressee. It then follows that for an intention to form the basis 
of an act of promising, its content must be of interest to the 
addressee. The content of the promising referred to here is 
equivalent to the intentional object of the promising, and as was 
mentioned above, the intentional objects of the intending to do X, 
of the intending to promise to do X, and of the inner and outer 
sides of the promising itself all coincide or at least are related 
to each other. 
Another situation that could occur is that the content of 
the act of promising is not in the interests of the addressee, or in 
other words, it is against his interests. A deception might here be 
present on the part of the promiser, who may act as if the content 
is in the interests of the addressee. (This would not be an example 
of a pseudo-promise, however, because the promisor does intend to 
fulfill the cont ent of the proposed promise). Can a promise come 
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into existence in this situation? The answer depends on whether the 
content of the act of promising is morally wrong or not. Not all 
actions which are against the interests of a person are thereby 
immoral. 67 If then. the content of the promising was morally wrong 
at the time the promise was made. then as explained above. the 
promise does not come into existence from the beginning. If however 
the content is not intrinsically wrong but becomes wrong after the 
promise is made. then this would be a situation in which a higher duty 
supersedes the duty to fulfill the claim. 
If the content is not morally wrong. and does not become 
morally wrong due to external circumstances. then there does not 
seem to be any reason why the promise would not come into existence. 
The exception to this would be if the addressee rejects the 
promising from the start. because in this case the promise would not 
come into being. 68 If the addressee does not realize at first that 
the content is against his interests. then although the promise 
might come into being. he can always waive his claim. 
It is. of course. not even necessary for the content of the 
promise to be against the interests of the promisee in order for the 
promisee to be able to waive his claim. The content could at first 
be of interest to him and later not. At the later time. he can 
still waive his claim. Or perhaps he simply changes his mind. The 
promisee can always waive his claim. because there is no obligation 
to keep a claim. 69 A problematic situation would occur. however. if 
the promisee never realizes that the content of the promise is 
against his interests. Could he actually have a claim that harm be 
done to him? Even worse. what if he promises to accept this claim? 
-
Does he then have an obligation to accept a claim that would be bad 
for him? 
Tackling the first case. as long as the content is not 
morally wrong but simply to the disadvantage of the promisee. then 
the promisee does in fact have a claim that something be done which 
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is against his interests. If he never realizes this and does not opt to 
waive his claim. then the promisor's obligation to do what is to the 
promisee's disadvantage is indeed to be fulfilled. 
Taking the more complicated case of the promisee himself making a 
promise to accept the promise made to him. the analysis again 
depends on whether the content is morally wrong or not. If the 
content is morally wrong. then the situation would be analyzed as 
explained earlier. If the content is not morally wrong but simply 
not to the advantage of the original promisee. then it might seem 
that the original promisee has waived his right to waive his claim 
by promising not to waive it. Reinach. however. holds that even if 
one has promised to accept a service. 
It is false to say that the claim cannot then be waived. 
for the ability to waive is grounded immutably in the 
essence of a claim. But even if the claim is waived 
there still very much remains. on the basis of the 
second promise. an obligation in the holder of the 
original c laim/O 
So it seems that one can never promise not to waive a claim. 
but only promise to accept the conte .nt of a promise. If one waives 
the claim. then the original promisor no longer has an obligation. 
One would. however. have an obligation to accept the original 
promise as long as the original promiser does not waive his claim 
that his promise be accepted. Thus it is possible to have an 
-obligation to accept a claim that is to one's disadvantage. Perhaps 
this is truly a case in which the promise can be said to be 
'defective'. 
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-CHAPTER FIVE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE MAKING OF A MARRIAGE VOW AND 
THE VOW AS COMPARED AND CONTRASTED WITH PROMISING 
AND THE PROMISE 
On the basis of the analysis of promising and the promise. a:n 
analysis of vowing and the vow will now be attempted. The act of 
making a vow. like the making of a promise. results in a claim and 
obligation. and thus brings a bond into existence. Because of this. 
the vow is a type of commitment. The bond is objective in the same 
sense that the bond created by the act of promising is objective. 
What must be examined are the ways in which the vow is 
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similar to the promise and different from it. There are times when the 
words "promise" and "vow'' are used interchangeably. as when the vow 
taken in marriage is referred to as the "marriage promise". (This 
usage is present in the article en tit led "Marital Fidelity'' by Susan 
Mendus. which will be referred to below.) In fact in the taking of 
marriage vows. each person is normally asked whether they promise to 
"love honor and obey''. and the vow has been defined as a "solemn 
promise ••• an act by which one consecrates or devotes himself to 
· d' · 1 · 1171 some act. service or con ition ••• a so emn assertion ••• 
As will be shown below. however. what Reinach has held to be 
characteristic of promises does not always hold true of vows. and so 
either the above usages are not very precise in treating vows as if 
they were a type of promise. or Reinach has failed to take into 
account a specific type of promise which does not share all of the 
characteristics that the other types of promises have. Much 
depends, of course, on whether the differences between vows and · 
promises are essential or not. An essential difference between the 
two would require the use of a different name for each. 
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The answer to this question should be clear after an 
analysis has been made regarding the essential nature of the vow. 
Let it be clear from the beginning, however, that only those acts by 
which a person binds himself to something outside of himself, 
creating an extra-mentally existing bond, will be considered. This 
will rule out simple declarations and assertions which are at times 
loosely referred to as vows. 
What complicates matters is the fact that there are 
different types of vows, for example a marriage vow, religious vows, 
and a vow to change a certain behavior, to name a few. To simplify 
matters, a particular type of vow, the vow taken in marriage, will 
be compared and contrasted with the promise. No claim will be made 
that what holds true of the marriage vow also holds true of these 
other types of vows, and from here on whenever the term vow is used 
it should be assumed that what is meant is the marriage vow. 
The vow, which is the product, so to speak, of the vowing, 
or making of the vow, seems to be nothing more than the bond which 
the act of vowing brings into existence. Because of this, the vow 
will at times be referred to simply as 'the bond', and of course it 
should be understood that if the term vow is used, it refers to the 
bond. 
Since the act of vowing brings claim and obligation into 
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existence, and as mentioned above the existence of the claim and 
obligation is an objective one, the act of vowing must be more than 
simply an expression of intention • . This follows for the same reasons 
that the act of promising must be more thah simply an expression of 
intention to account for the existence of an objectively existing 
claim and obligation; namely, that an expression of intention does 
not bring an objective bond into existence. 
What then is the nature of the act of vowing? First of all, 
the marriage vow is not only an intentional act but is also a 
spontaneous act. It belongs to that particular type of spontaneous 
act which was called by Reinach the "social act," because it is not 
only other-directed. it also addresses the other and so must be 
externally expressed. Unique to the marriage vow is the element of 
reciprocity, which is a requirement for the marriage vow to even 
come into existence at all. 
The making of a marriage vow presupposes two internally 
complete experiences. One of the experiences is an intention to make 
a marriage vow, and this intention itself presupposes a further 
experience which is an intention to live up to a specific content. 
This content will coincide with the content of the intention to make 
a marriage vow. and with the content of the marriage vow itself, if 
it is made. 
The act of making a marriage vow itself consists of an inner 
experience which must exist in unity with an external expression of 
this experience. The inner experience, which can be referred to as 
the inner side of the act of making a vow, must be more than a mere 
intention. It is rather the vowing itself, the binding of oneself to 
the other. It is from this creative act that an efficacy proceeds; 
claim and obligation come into existence. 
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The expression of the vow. as the expression of the 
promise. is completely subject to our voluntariness. Furthermore. 
both persons must be making the vow free of coersion. It seems that 
this requirement would be satisfied if the vow indeed presupposes an 
intention to make the vow and an intention to live up to the content 
of the vow. 
Like the other social acts. the act of vowing can only be 
directed to the person to whom it is being made. A particular act of 
vowing can meaningfully be performed only once and thus can only be 
made in the present tense. It is true that at times a renewal of 
marriage vows take place. This renewal. however. is not an actual 
vowing. but is rather a reminder of the commitment which the spouses 
have already made to one another. (It can also be further meaningful 
if a promise is made as part of the renewal to try to live up to the 
vow more perfectly.) 
Just as with promising. the making of a marriage vow is not 
morally obligatory. Once one has made a vow. however. one has a 
moral obligation. 
Like the claim and obligation which arise from the act of 
promising. the claim and obligation which arise from the making of a 
vow are not mental entities. and neither can they be reduced to mere 
feelings of being obliged or entitled. Just as a pseudo-promise. it 
seems possible that a pseudo-vow can also be made. Although the 
person who makes the pseudo-vow might have an obligation as a result 
of it, it does not seem to follow that the partner would thereby 
have any obligation, especially once the deception is revealed. 
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Both the c1aim and obligation which come into existence from 
the act of making a vow are temporal in that they come into being at 
a specific time and refer to a future action, or more precisely, to 
a set of actions. 
Like the promise, the vow too can exist for years without 
change. On the other hand, promises were said to have an inherent 
tendency toward meeting an end and that this would most commonly 
occur if the promise is fulfilled or the claim is waived. Here are 
perhaps the two most significant differences between the marriage 
vow and the promise. First of all, it cannot be said in any way that 
a marriage vow has an inherent tendency toward being dissolved. It 
is of the very nature of the vow to last "till death do us part". It 
might be, of course, that the vow can meet an end in some way. This 
leads to the second significant difference between the marriage vow 
and promise, namely that the marriage vow does not meet an end by 
being fulfil led. In fact the term fulfil led has been purposely 
avoided in speaking of the marriage vow because it is so much more 
accurate to speak of "living up to" a vow. A vow can be lived up to 
more or less perfectly, but even if it were possible for a person to 
perfectly live up to the marriage vow, on a particular day perhaps, 
the vow clearly would still not then meet an end. 
An obvious question is: Although a vow does not meet an end 
by being fulfilled, can it meet an end by being waived? Since each 
spouse has a claim and an obligation, it seems apparent that if only 
one spouse waived his or her claim this would not affect the claim 
of the other spouse. It does seem possible, however, that both 
spouses could each waive their own claims, and limiting the 
discuss i on to natural reason, it seems that this would mean the 
dissolution of the bond,72 
The vow shares with the promise the fact that the claim and 
obligation of each presuppose a bearer, and the bearer in each case 
must be a person. Also, the claim and obligation must have a 
definite content to which they refer, and they must have an 
identical content. With a promise, however, one can have an 
obligation that something take place through another, but this does 
not seem to be at all possible when it comes to the ob l igation that 
arises from the making of the marriage vow. 
Secondly, three types of obligations arising from promising 
were distinguished, namely. an obligation which aims at an action. 
one which aims through an action at an end result, and one in which 
both means and end are determined, With the marriage vow, however, 
it does not seem that a means to an end would ever be determined. 
and even less that both means and end would be determined. 
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CHAPTER SIX: QUESTIONS THAT ARISE ON THE BASIS OF THE ABOVE 
ANALYSIS 
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It was said that a certain degree of control was necessary in 
order for an action to form the content of a promise. It seems that 
a certain degree of control over an action to form the content of 
marriage vow is also necessary, An important question to consider. 
then. is the following: what exactly is the content of the marriage 
vow? This question is not as straightforward as it may at first 
seem. One answer is that since the couple normally vows to "love. 
honor and obey till death". that loving. honoring and obeying till 
death must then be the content. Can a person have an adequate degree 
of control over loving. honoring and obeying for these to form the 
content of a vow? 
A vow to obey. first of all, is nonsensical unless only one 
of the person takes this vow. After all. if they each vow to obey 
the other. what happens when they disagree? There is no reason why 
the command of one spouse would hold any more or less weight than 
the opposite command of the other. The question of why one spouse 
would be required to take a vow to obey while the other does not is 
one which goes beyond the scope of this paper. and perhaps also 
beyond the realm of natural reason. Because of this. obedience will 
be ruled out as forming part of the content of the marriage vow. 
A vow to honor is actually less problematic than the vow to 
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obey, It seems that one does have control over whether one honors 
one's spouse or not. One might object to this by pointing out that 
one's spouse could change in such a way as to be no longer deserving 
of honor. and one does not exercise much control over this. It seems 
that honor is to be understood in a different way than this. 
however. and that the meaning is closer to that of reverence or 
respect, If it is assumed that all persons have an intrinsic value. 
then all persons would always be worthy of reverence, It follows 
then that a response of reverence is due to all persons. including 
one's spouse. On the other hand. if a response of reverence toward 
all persons is an obligation. then the vow to have reverence toward 
one's spouse seems to be a bit less significant, 
Most problematic is the vow to love, What degree of control. 
if any. can one have over loving? Susan Mendus, in her article 
entitled "Marital Faithfulness." explains that 11 .. ,the most familiar 
objection to the marriage promise (is that) it is a promise about 
feelings. where these are not under the direct control of the 
will. 1173 (Mendus herself does not address this objection,) Is it 
accurate to claim that the marriage vow is a vow about feelings? Can 
feelings be under the direct control of the will. and if so is the 
degree of control adequate enough for the feelings to form the basis 
of an act of vowing? The answer to the first of these questions 
depends upon the answer to another question. namely. what is the 
nature of love? Is it a mere feeling. or an act of the will. or 
perhaps some combination of these two elemants? In the book. "The 
Art of Living" by Dietrich and Alice Von Hildebrand. it is explained 
that many philosophers traditionally have insisted that loving is an 
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act of the will because they wish to save its spirituality, 74 and 
perhaps also because they wish to give it a position of honor, 
holding it to be somehow above the realm of mere instincts, physical 
feelings, and fleeting emotions. The term "spiritual" is here a 
technical term used by the Von Hildebrands in a meaning which does 
not coincide with any of the everyday connotations of the term. Its 
meaning should become clear after several marks of the spiritual 
character of an experience are mentioned below. 
The definition of love as an act of the will does not seem 
to be in line with the experience of love in a real, concrete 
situation. If the person I love " •.. only wills to love me, I am 
quite right in thinking this is a poor substitute; I realize that he 
has not given me his true self ••• 11• 75 
Moreover, love is experienced as having a warmth, a 
plenitude and a depth which is not present in a "naked" act of 
willing. 76 Thus. according to the Von Hildebrands, love must not be 
a mere act of the will but must rather be . an affective response. 
This does not mean. however, that love is not spiritual. 77 To see 
that this is true. it is first necessary to understand that there 
are two essentially different types of affectivity: the lower. non-
spiritual affective experience. like for example a state of 
depression and the higher. spiritual affective response, of which 
joy is an example. That joy is a spiritual type of response is 
evident, first of all, by the fact that it consists of an 
intentional relation to an object or event.7 8 The term "intentional" 
is a technical term the meaning of which does not coinicide with the 
common meaning of "on purpose". It rather denotes a type of 
experience that presupposes an object. That is. in experiencing joy 
a person has a conscious. meaningful. intelligible relation to a 
particular object or event which is the source of the joy. or more 
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precisely. joy involves a response to the object. This 
intentionality is the first presupposition for the spirituality of a 
human experience. 79 The affective value response of joy also 
involves a transcendence of the self to the object of the joy. and 
this transcendence is a second fundamental mark of spirituality. And 
a third mark of the spiritual character of this joy discloses itself 
in the fact that we need not have formerly experienced that 
something engenders joy in order to grasp that it can engender 
joy. 8° For example. if a person has never before experienced spousal 
love. and a friend who is getting married explains to him the nature 
of this love. the first person can grasp the fact that spousal love 
can be the source of deep joy. 
Finally. " ••• affective value responses. for example a value 
responding joy. a love. a veneration. presuppose the body not a whit 
more than an act of will. •• 1181 Love belongs to this higher. 
spiritual type of affectivity. the affective value response. Like 
joy. which is referred to in the "Art of Living" as both an 
experience and a response. 82 love. too. is both an experience and a 
response. So in answer to the enquiry of whether the marriage vow is 
a vow about feelings. the response appears to be affirmative. since 
it seems obvious that love should be present with the making of a 
marriage vow. and love. as has been shown. is in fact a feeling. The 
next question is whether this particular type of feeling can indeed 
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form the content of a vow. What degree of control can be exercised 
over love. or in other words. what role if any does the will have in 
the act of loving? 
As a feeling. love is not under the direct control of the 
will; it is not in itself free. It is rather willing which has the 
extraordinary feature of being free. 83 The Von Hildebrands explain 
that even if we wanted to. we could neither engender nor command. the 
response of love. This does not mean. however. that love is 
completely outside the realm of a person's freedom. First of all. 
love is within the range of one's indirect power: 
By means of our free will we can do many things in order to 
liberate our heart from the obstacles which hinder it from giving 
the right response. Similarly. the possession of virtues is not 
within our direct power. We cannot command them as we can command 
actions. Yet nobody will deny that we can strive for the possession 
of a virtue. and that we are responsible for not possessing it. 84 
This is not the only way in which the affective value 
response of love is related to freedom. Love can share in our direct 
freedom by the fact it can be sanctioned with one's free will. 85 
Returning to the objection which holds that the marriage 
vow is invalid as a vow since it is a vow about feelings which are 
not under the direct control of the will. we would have to agree. it 
seems. with both the characterization of love as a feeling. although 
with the distinctions made above. and with the idea that it is 
therefore not under the direct control of the will. But whether 
these two points make love invalid as the content of the marriage 
vow is not so clear, since the will is involved, as has been shown, 
and it seems one can be held responsible for neglecting to overcome 
the obstacles to love and for not sanctioning love. 
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Love itself is within the range of one's indirect power, and 
it is within the range of one's direct power to sanction love. The 
question is, is this degree of control adequate enough to allow 
loving to form the content of the marriage vow? After all, since it 
is a feeling, it is plausible that love could simply disappear, or 
be lost. It seems, then, that there is not an adequate degree of 
control over love in order for it to form the content of the 
marriage vow, because one cannot have direct control over love 
itself. 
On the other hand, it seems that love cannot be separated 
from a certain giving of self, and a giving of self is under direct 
control of the will. The giving of self does form part of the 
content of the marraige vow: 11 ••• the two partners give themselves 
expressly to each other, fully sanctioning this surrender for their 
entire lifetime. 1186 Love is the reason for the giving of self, it is 
what makes the giving of self desirable. But the giving of self can, 
it seems, occur in the absence of love. Thus love itself has still 
not been included as part of the content of the marriage vow. And 
yet, one vows to love. Perhaps the answer is that only a particular 
type of love can form the content of the marriage vow. That is, 
although it seems that spousal love, which by definition is quite 
intense, 87 cannot form the content of the marriage vow, perhaps a 
different kind of love can be part of the content. Charitable love 
seems to be a likely candidate. Charitable love, however, is still 
58 
love and as such seems to involve feelings which are not under the 
direct control of the will. Admittedly, the perf~rmance of 
charitable actions will most likely lead to charitable love, but 
then only the performance of charitable actions can form the content 
of the vow, and not charitable love itself. 
It also does not seem that charitable actions themselves can 
be defined as a type of love. A charitable action, even if defined 
as an action which is motivated out of concern for the good of 
another, can be performed with a cold sense of duty instead of with 
all of the warmth and plenitude that is present with love. 
Thus far, then, the content of the marriage vow seems to 
include the removal of obstacles to love, the sanctioning of love as 
long as it is present, the giving of oneself to the other, the 
performance of charitable actions, and reverence for the other. The 
last of these seems closest to a vow to love, but love itself is 
still not part of the content. 
What changes matters is if love is defined as the willing of 
the other's good, then it can form part of the content of the 
marriage vow. Willing another's good is different from willing to 
love someone. And yet it is still an act of willing. What of the 
warmth, plenitude and depth which seem so inseparable from love? 
After all it does seem true that one can tell the difference between 
an act of kindness performed out of love, and one performed out of a 
cold sense of duty. Perhaps the answer is that if one truly wills 
the good for another, the warmth, plenitude, and depth so 
characteristic of love will also be present. But even if at times 
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they are not present. the love is not therefore lost. The willing of 
the other's good is the anchor. so to speak. of the love. The 
warmth. plenitude. and depth are an extra gift that come with a love 
that is nearer to perfection. but are not essential to love itself. 
In the section on promising the issue of promises becoming 
impossible to fulfill was raised. As already mentioned. it is not 
accurate to speak of the marriage vow being fulfilled. but only of 
it being lived up to to a greater or lesser degree. A question can 
be raised. however. as to whether it can happen that a marriage vow 
becomes impossible to live up to at all. What would happen if one of 
the spouses became unable to fulfill any of his or her obligations 
to the other? It seems that the only way that this could occur is if 
the person suffered a loss of rationality. If only one spouse 
suffers a loss of rationality. even if the loss is not only severe 
but permanent. it is only this person who cannot live up to the vow. 
It does not seem that it follows that it would become impossible for 
the other to live up to the vow. If both spouses. however. suffer a 
severe and permanent loss of rationality, then of course the vow 
does become impossible to live up to by either spouse. In this case. 
it seems that the vow would still be in existence. but the peculiar 
kind of meaninglessness. which was mentioned above in reference to 
certain promises. would then be predicable of the vow. 
The death of one or both spouses would mean the dissolution 
of the vow altogether. since the absence of a bearer would cause 
that person's claim and obligation to dissolve. and thus the 
relationship would cease to exist. It does not seem. as with 
promises. that anything can happen in the world. that is. rather 
than to one or both of the spouses, that would make the vow either 
impossible to live up to or that would cause it to cease to exist. 
The question of the obligation of the marriage vow being 
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outweighed by a higher duty to act morally is not here relevant, 
because similar to promising, vowing that has an immoral content 
does not bring a vow into existence. Thus if the vow comes into 
existence then the content cannot be immoral. Further, it does not 
seem that it could ever become immoral. A vow would also not meet an 
end by being superseded by a higher duty to take care of an evil, 
for example. A specific action which one might be obliged to perform 
as a result of the vow could perhaps be outweighed by a higher duty 
to save a person's life, for example, but the obligation of the vow 
would never be completely superseded. 
With respect to the act of promising, a question was raised 
as to whether the content of the promise had to be of interest to 
the promisee for the promise to come into existence. This question 
does not have a relevancy in the case of the marriage vow because 
as mentioned above, the vow must be reciprocated in order for it to 
even come into existence, and obviously for one to reciprocate a 
vow one must be interested in the vow of the other. 
Another question was how to evaluate the situation when the 
content of the promise was not only not of interest to the other, 
but against the interests of the other. It does not seem that the 
content of the vow could ever be against the interests of a person. 
On the other hand, the vow itself, the extra-mentally existing bond, 
could indeed be against the interests of one or both persons. There 
are two separate cases here. one is that the proposed vow was 
against the interests of one or both persons from the time before 
the vow was even made. In this case. especially if a deception had 
occurred. it might be that the vow would not have come into 
existence at all. 
Secondly. the vow can come to be against the interests of 
one or persons. For example. one or both spouses might stop trying 
altogether to live up to the vow after a certain period of time has 
passed. In this case. limiting the discussion once again to natural 
reason. if both persons each waive their own claim through a 
completely voluntary and uncoersed act. then it seems that this 
would lead to the dissolution of the vow. 88 If. though. only one of 
the spouses wished to be free from the vow. this would not then 
cause the vow to cease to exist. because of the fact that the vow 
has an extra-mental existence and is therefore independent of the 
feelings of either person. 
6 1 
Finally. the topic of promises that have conditions was 
analyzed, Does this have any application to the marriage vow? Can 
the marrriage vow have a condition? Keeping within the realm of 
natural reason. it might be that just as one may be released from a 
promise by the call of a higher duty. for example. one may also be 
released from a marriage vow by something such as the total 
abandonment by one's spouse. Even if neither of these conditions are 
explicitly stated. they are still implicitly present. These 
conditions which need not even be mentioned can be referred to as 
basic conditions. 89 The question is. can there ever be conditions 
attached to the marriage vow besides these basic conditions? It 
seems that the answer is yes. as long as the condition is stated 
explicitly, understood and agreed to by both parties before the vow 
is made.90 An example of such a condition could be. "So long as you 
don't become a member of the Conservative Party 11.9l 
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On the other hand. since t he marriage vow is taken "til 1 
death do us part". it does not seem possible that the vow could have 
a time limit. although a promise oftentimes has this as a condition. 
The marriage vow also cannot have as a condition the death of either 
spouse. for obvious reasons. Furthermore, it seems that the 
possibility of a third party is precluded with the marriage vow. 
That is. it does not seem possible that there can be an addressee of 
the content of the obligation other than the person to whom the vow 
is made. 
In conclusion. then. although the marriage vow is similar to 
the promise in many ways. nonetheless the marriage vow is different 
enough from the anaysis of the promise given by Reinach to call it 
by a different name. 
This paper has attempted to do justice to the superb 
analysis of the promise and the act of promising accomplished by 
Reinach. and perhaps rather than clouding the subject. has served 
rather to further uncover some of Reinach's insights. In addition. 
the nature of the promise and promising. and of the vow and the act 
of making a vow. have perhaps become clearer both as to their 
similarities and differences. 
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